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This article tests the hypothesis that democracies exhibit stronger international 
environmental commitment than non-democracies using multivariate econometric 
techniques. A number of proxy variables are used in lieu of environmental commitment, a 
non-observable variable. Strong evidence is found that democracies sign and ratify more 
multilateral environmental agreements, participate in more environmental 
intergovernmental organisations, comply better with reporting requirements under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, put a greater 
percentage of their land area under protections status, are more likely to have a National 
Council on Sustainable Development in their country and have more environmentally 
relevant information available than non-democracies. The findings suggest that a spread of 
democracy around the world will lead to enhanced environmental commitment worldwide. 
Results are robust with respect to inclusion or exclusion of developed countries in the 
sample. The use of four different variables for democracy also ensures robustness with 
respect to the measure of democracy. The strong evidence in favour of a positive link 
between democracy and environmental commitment stands in contrast to the somewhat 
weak evidence on such a link between democracy and environmental outcomes. The 
explanation presumably is that theory predicts a stronger positive link of democracy with 
environmental commitment than with environmental outcomes. 
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'I have therefore come to believe that an essential 
prerequisite for saving the environment is the spread of 
democratic government to more nations of the world.' 
(Ex-US Vice President Al Gore, 1992: 179) 
 
Introduction 
Is democracy good or bad for the environment? This is a complex question without a clear 
cut answer. As Desai (1998a: 301) concedes: ‘whether democracies are more likely to be 
environmentally friendly is not entirely clear’. Indeed, there is only weak statistical 
evidence in favour of democracy promoting environmental outcomes. Do democracies 
show stronger international environmental commitment than non-democracies? This 
question refers only to a subset of the democracy and environment problem area, but it has 
the advantage that it has a clear affirmative answer as the empirical analysis in this article 
will show. 
After presenting some theoretical considerations on the democracy and environment 
relationship and reviewing the relevant empirical literature, the case for focusing on 
international environmental commitment is put forward. The hypothesis that democracies 
exhibit stronger international environmental commitment is empirically tested and strongly 
confirmed by the analysis. Of course, it would have been desirable to analyse more 
comprehensively domestic environmental commitment as well. However, due to lack of 
comparable cross-sectional data only two of the variables used in the empirical analysis of 
this article could be interpreted as proxies for domestic environmental commitment.1 
Therefore, while in the following I will simply speak of environmental commitment, the 
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reader should keep in mind that this article’s analysis really establishes a positive impact of 
democracy on international environmental commitment only. 
 
Democracy and Environment: Theoretical Considerations 
Payne (1995) has provided what amounts to probably the most comprehensive theoretical 
treatise in favour of a positive impact of democracy on the environment. The gist of his 
argument is that in democracies citizens are better informed about environmental problems 
(freedom of press) and can better express their environmental concerns and demands 
(freedom of speech), which will facilitate an organisation of environmental interests 
(freedom of association), which will in turn put pressure on policy entrepreneurs operating 
in a competitive political system to respond positively to these demands (freedom of vote), 
both domestically as well as via international cooperation. In non-democratic systems, on 
the other hand, governments are likely to restrict the access of their population to 
information, restrict the voicing of concerns and demands, restrict the organisation of 
interests and isolate themselves from the citizens’ preferences. In other words, in 
democracies if citizens are concerned about environmental problems this will eventually 
require policy makers to exhibit stronger environmental commitment to address these 
concerns and honour the demand for environmental protection measures. 
The same cannot be said of non-democracies, for which Chadwick (1995: 575) argues 
that ‘environmental signals and concerns which conflict with state development plans may 
be silenced, and state managers may even fool themselves into thinking such concerns do 
not exist’. He further suggests that non-democracies tend to de-sensitize themselves from 
environmental problems concentrated in areas of the excluded and powerless populace, 
thus systematically neglecting the costs of environmental degradation. 
5 
Congleton (1992) examines how the median voter in a democratic system and an 
authoritarian ruler in a non-democratic system would set environmental regulations so as to 
maximize their respective utilities. There are two relevant factors. First, Congleton assumes 
that a shorter time horizon will lead to less strict environmental regulations. This can be 
justified by the long-term nature of many environmental problems. Since authoritarian 
rulers tend to have a shorter time horizon for fear of being thrown out of office, he predicts 
that democracies may have stricter environmental regulations than non-democracies. 
Second, the authoritarian ruler also appropriates a larger share of income from the 
economy. The effect of this on the strictness of environmental regulations is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, a larger national income share might lead to less strict regulations given 
that such regulations are costly in terms of reducing available national income: ‘An 
increase in the fraction of national income going to the individual of interest increases the 
marginal cost of environmental standards faced by him, since he will now bear a larger 
fraction of associated reductions in national income’ (ibid.: 416). On the other hand, 
appropriation of a larger share of the national income might also lead to stricter 
environmental standards if we assume that environmental quality is a normal, if not luxury, 
good where a higher income leads to increased demand for environmental quality. The 
result therefore depends on the net effect. Democracy is therefore not necessarily good for 
the environment. 
From a more dynamic perspective, concern has been raised with regard to the 
compatibility of democracy and the protection of the environment. Democracies with their 
emphasis on private property rights and individual liberty provide the opportunities for 
individuals and businesses to make full use of their potential to expand production and 
consumption, which, if not sufficiently counter-acted by environmental regulation, will 
increase pressure on the environment. In a slightly different vein, Desai (1998b: 11) 
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suspects that ‘as democracy is dependent on economic development, and since economic 
growth and prosperity generally result in environmental pollution and ecological 
destruction, democracy would not necessarily be protective of the environment’. 
While there is no clear evidence on whether democratic countries as such grow faster 
than non-democratic countries (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993; Barro, 1997; Durham, 1999), 
democracy is positively correlated with factors such as security of property rights (Knack & 
Keefer, 1995) and “social infrastructure” (Hall & Jones, 1999) that cause good economic 
performance. After all, all developed countries are democracies, even though the reverse is 
obviously not true. (For the purpose of this article, developed countries means the US, 
Canada, the member states of the European Union (EU-15) plus Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland as well as Japan, Australia and New Zealand.) 
Also, while the view that economic growth inevitably leads to increased environmental 
degradation across the board is overly simplistic, certain environmental problems do 
exacerbate with economic growth. Generally, while environmental problems directly 
affecting the health of a country’s population are likely to improve with economic growth 
(at least after some threshold of income has been achieved), pollutants that can be 
externalized upon the future and/or people outside a country’s boundaries are likely to 
worsen (Neumayer, 1999; Panayotou, 2000). An example for the latter would be carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
On a final note, it has been argued by some that it might be more difficult in 
democracies than in autocracies to constrain environmentally damaging economic activities 
as well as population growth since in autocracies the government does not have to pay as 
much attention to its citizens’ rights to engage in such activities and their rights for 
procreation. It is exactly this writers such as Hardin (1968) or Heilbronner (1974) had in 
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mind in voicing their early concern on whether democracy could be relied upon to solve 
environmental problems. 
In conclusion, while a good theoretical case can be made for a positive link between 
democracy and environment, there are a number of considerations pointing in the opposite 
direction. The link between democracy and environment is therefore a complex one. It is 
doubtful, to say the least, whether this complexity is fully addressed in simply entering 
income as a control variable in empirical studies 
 Unfortunately, the more theoretical contributions do not really distinguish between 
environmental commitment and its effect on environmental outcomes. This is not 
surprising since the potential divide between commitment and outcomes is not recognized 
as a problem. In turning to a review of the relevant literature now we will see that most 
empirical studies have only looked at environmental outcomes and have found only weak 
evidence at best for a positive link with democracy which calls for a re-focus of empirical 
studies on environmental commitment instead. 
 
 
Review and Critique of Existing Empirical Literature 
Both political scientists and economists have addressed the empirical links between 
democracy and environment. In accordance with the unfortunate, but quite common, 
disciplinary divide, the economists’ research efforts are not recognized by political 
scientists and vice versa. Congleton (1992) represents one of the earliest empirical 
contribution by economists. Ideally, in order to test his theory (as described in the last 
section), he would need to address differences in domestic environmental regulation. For 
lack of data, he sees himself unable to do so and instead performs ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions on Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) and methane emissions as well as logit 
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estimates of signature of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, using 
Freedom House data for the democracy variable. He finds that democratic countries, after 
controlling for a range of variables, are more likely to sign the Vienna Convention and the 
Montreal Protocol, but also have higher methane and CFC emissions. Murdoch & Sandler 
(1997) show, however, that while democracies might have higher absolute levels of CFC 
emissions, as indicated by Congleton (1992), democracy is also a marginally significant 
determinant of CFC emission reductions between 1986 and 1989.2 
Both Barrett & Graddy (2000) and Torras & Boyce (1998) use the panel data, with 
which Grossman & Krueger (1995) in their famous contribution established empirical links 
between a country’s income level and its water and air pollution emissions (laying the 
foundation for the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature).3 Barrett & 
Graddy, using Freedom House data and generalized least squares with a random effects 
estimator, find that countries with high political rights and civil liberties tend to have lower 
air and water pollution levels. Torras & Boyce, using the same data, come to similar 
findings using OLS instead. Scruggs (1998), using Freedom House data in OLS estimation, 
finds that democracy is statistically insignificant once one controls for income inequality in 
the case of dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform and particulates emissions. It assumes 
statistical significance only for the case of sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. 
On the part of political science, Gleditsch & Sverdrup (1996) run simple bivariate 
correlations, using Polity data, with a range of environmental variables, such as greenhouse 
gas emissions, extent of deforestation (both show negative correlation), signature and 
ratification of environmental treaties and the presence of environmental organizations (both 
show positive correlation). Midlarsky (1998), using Freedom House, Polity and a third data 
set based on Bollen (1993) for measuring democracy, runs multivariate OLS regressions 
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with several environmental aspects as the dependent variable, such as deforestation, CO2 
emissions, soil erosion and land area protection. He finds that democratic countries tend to 
have higher deforestation rates, higher CO2 emissions, possibly higher soil erosion, but also 
protect a higher percentage of their land area. Contrary to Midlarsky (1998), Didia (1997) 
finds that democracies have lower deforestation rates, but only simple univariate regression 
analysis is employed. 
All these empirical studies suffer from a number of weaknesses. No comprehensive 
critique is attempted here, rather I will concentrate on the aspects most relevant to this 
study. Congleton (1992) based his analysis on data from 1988. Were he to repeat his 
analysis with data from 2001, his attempt to arrive at significant results would be frustrated 
by the fact that both the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol have achieved 
almost universal coverage in the meantime. What he would need to do then is to look at 
whether democracies have signed or ratified these agreements earlier in time than non-
democracies. These kind of studies have been done employing a proportional hazards 
model and finding that democracies, as measured by Freedom House data, are more likely 
than non-democracies to ratify at an early stage the United Nations Framework Climate 
Change Convention (Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000) as well as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and 
Flora (Neumayer, 2001). 
Even more troublesome, Congleton’s original sample is likely to have been biased. 
This is because at the early stages of multilateral action on ozone layer depletion, it was 
very much a developed country concern as well as a phenomenon largely caused by 
developed country emissions. While some developing countries were pro-active from the 
beginning, most waited to see what developed countries were willing to offer them for 
curtailing their future growth in consumption of ozone depleting substances (Benedick, 
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1998). Consequently, in 1988 out of the 28 signatory or contracting parties to the Vienna 
Convention 19 were developed countries according to the definition used in this article. So 
were 18 of the 29 parties to the Montreal Protocol. Because all developed countries are 
democracies, this leads to biased estimates. 
Barrett & Graddy (2000) group countries into low, medium and high civil and political 
freedom, using dummy variables, as well as entering civil and political freedoms as 
continuous variables in separate regressions. A closer look at their results reveals that the 
study provides only limited evidence for a positive impact of freedom on the environment 
First, some of the variables have signs contrary to expectation. Second, and more 
importantly, practically none of the dummy or continuous variables are statistically 
significant on their own in spite of the quite high number of observations4, which all other 
things equal boosts significance. It is only in their combination that these variables gain 
some statistical significance in all air pollution regressions. For the water pollution 
regressions even the combined explanatory power of the freedom variables is statistically 
insignificant in the majority of cases. Thus, Barrett & Graddy (2000) provide at best some 
statistical evidence for a negative link between freedom and air and water pollution. 
Torras & Boyce (1998) enter freedom only as a continuous variable and estimate 
separate coefficients for countries above and below $5000 per capita income in purchasing 
power parity. Out of 14 regressions, the freedom coefficient has six times an unexpected 
sign, particularly prevalent in the subset of high income countries, and is statistically 
insignificant in a further three cases. Another weakness of the study is that in spite of using 
panel data, no time-series for the freedom variable is constructed. Instead the freedom 
variable is set equal to the 1995 value throughout. The empirical evidence resulting from 
their study is therefore not particularly strong either. Unfortunately, the two studies are not 
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directly comparable with each other since differing statistical techniques are used and 
Torras & Boyce (1998) also control for income inequality and literacy. 
 
 
The Case for Focusing on Environmental Commitment 
The more general problem with much of the empirical literature is that it focuses too much 
on environmental outcomes instead of looking at environmental commitment. Take 
Midlarsky’s (1998) examination of CO2 emissions and soil degradation as an example. It 
suffers from the same kind of problem as Torras & Boyce (1998) and Barrett & Graddy 
(2000), which similarly concentrate on environmental outcomes. Why would we expect 
democracies to have more or less severe soil degradation? Soil degradation depends on a 
plethora of factors including natural ones, most of which have absolutely nothing to do 
with democracy. No wonder then that no robust statistical relationship can be established. 
Yes, we would expect democratic countries to engage more in an international agreement 
addressing soil erosion, if there was one. We would also expect democratic countries to 
engage more in activities stemming the spread of soil erosion. But we would not 
necessarily expect them to have less soil degradation, at least not until many years have 
passed and the prevention activities referred to above have had an impact. Similarly with 
respect to CO2 emissions. Why would we expect a significant relationship here? As argued 
above, it is the quintessential example of an environmental problem that can be 
externalised upon the future and people outside a country’s boundaries. It is also strongly 
influenced by economic growth and the historic mix of primary energy types in use. Both 
are difficult for policy makers to control. Midlarsky (1998) finds a strong statistically 
significant relationship with only one of his democracy variables, namely the Polity 
variable. Even this result is most likely an artefact of functional mis-specification, 
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however. As simple a transformation as including squared and cubic GDP per capita in the 
estimation (a standard procedure in the relevant EKC literature), renders the Polity variable 
insignificant.5 Again, we would expect democracies to more actively engage in a MEA 
addressing global warming such as the Kyoto Protocol (and further below we will see that 
they actually do), but only years or decades later will this translate into a statistically 
significant relationship with CO2 emissions (but, of course, with respect to growth rates of 
emissions and not with respect to absolute levels, as modelled by Midlarsky, 1998). 
Hence, at best there is to be expected only a weak link between democracy and (some) 
environmental outcomes. This is the ultimate reason, I would submit, why studies 
examining the impact of democracy on environmental outcomes in general provide only 
weak statistical evidence.6 Interestingly, the outcome variables for which Torras & Boyce 
(1998) find the strongest evidence for a significant relationship with democracy are smoke 
emissions and fecal coliform effluents – two variables that do not suffer from severe time 
lags between commitment and outcome, that are well within the control of policy makers, 
that strongly affect the health of citizens and success is easily monitored by the electorate. 
Similarly, the only dependent environmental outcome variable for which Midlarsky (1998) 
finds a relatively significant relationship with democracy, namely deforestation, is also the 
one, where he can put forward a relatively plausible theoretical argument establishing such 
a link. 
A much stronger theoretical argument can be made for a positive relationship between 
democracy and environmental commitment. In democracies people can express their 
environmental preferences better, these preferences will be honoured or addressed better by 
policy makers and this should translate into stronger revealed environmental commitment. 
But it need not translate into better environmental outcomes. The link between democracy 
and environmental outcomes is likely to be weaker the more factors outside a government’s 
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control impact upon outcomes, the longer the time span between environmental 
commitment and its effect on environmental outcomes is and the more difficult 
environmental outcomes are to monitor. If these conditions hold true, then the electorate in 
a democracy will appreciate the difficulty of holding governments accountable for 
environmental outcomes rather than commitment and will look for commitment instead. 
What needs to be done therefore is to re-adjust the focus away from environmental 
outcomes and towards environmental commitment. Congleton (1992) in principle 
addresses environmental commitment, but his analysis has serious weaknesses as seen 
above. In one of his variables, namely protected land area (a variable included in this study 
as well), Midlarsky (1998) himself looks at environmental commitment rather than 
outcomes. So do Gleditsch & Sverdrup (1996) in some of their variables, but simple 
bivariate analysis is often misleading and sensitive to the inclusion of control variables. In 
some sense therefore this work builds upon and extends these earlier attempts. It tries to 
provide a comprehensive and robust empirical analysis of the impact of democracy on 
environmental commitment. 
 
 
Four Measures of Democracy 
What exactly is democracy and how can it be measured best? This is difficult to answer 
and it would be vastly beyond the scope of this article to provide an original contribution to 
this complex question. Instead, I will simply employ four different measures of democracy 
that are implicitly based on different conceptions of what constitutes democracy and hope 
that together they cover comprehensively the complexity of democracy. Connected to this, 
the use of four different measures is also motivated by a desire to ensure robustness of the 
results. We put more confidence in the results if they hold true independent of the specific 
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measure of democracy chosen. If not, then this would have to be explained at least with 
reference to differences in the underlying conception of democracy. If no satisfactory 
explanation could be given, it would also put the results themselves into doubt. The four 
measures of democracy to be used in this study are: 
 
• A combined index of political rights and civil liberties based on Freedom House data. 
• A combined index of democracy and autocracy based on the Polity project. 
• Vanhanen’s index of democracy based on the so-called polyarchy dataset. 
• A governance indicator named “voice and accountability”, developed by World Bank 
staff. 
 
While, obviously and expectedly so, there is positive correlation among the various 
measures of democracy, it is less than perfect (see appendix 1).7 More importantly, each 
measure is based on a somewhat different conception of what constitutes democracy. The 
Freedom House data are based on expert assessments of the extent to which a country 
effectively provides for political rights and civil liberties, both measured on a 1 to 7 scale 
(Karatnycky, 1999: 546-553). Political rights refer to, for example, the existence and 
fairness of elections, existence of opposition and the possibility to take over power via 
elections. Civil liberties refer to, for example, the freedom of assembly, the right to open 
and free discussion, the independence of media, protection from political terror and the 
prevalence of the rule of law. 
The Polity data are also based on expert judgement on aspects of institutionalized 
democracy and autocracy within a country, both measured on an additive 0 to 10 scale 
(Jaggers & Gurr, 1995). The criteria of assessment for the democracy score include the 
competitiveness of political participation (1-3), the competitiveness (1-2) and openness (1) 
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of executive recruitment as well as the constraints on the chief executive (1-4). The 
autocracy score consists of restrictions on the competitiveness (1-2) and regulation (1-2) of 
political participation, the restrictions on the competitiveness (1-2) and lack of openness 
(1) of executive recruitment and the lack of constraints on the chief executive (1-3). 
The governance indicator combines seven indicators measuring, for example, the 
extent of civil liberties, political rights and independence of media, the involvement of 
military forces in politics and the responsiveness of government to its people as well as 
transparency of government decisions particularly with respect to decisions affecting and 
concerning business (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999a, b). Some of these base 
indicators stem from expert assessments, others from surveys of entrepreneurs. One of the 
indicators entering is the Freedom House indicator. Hence there is some overlap between 
the two. Because the indicators differ in their coverage of countries and therefore in their 
“representativeness”, they are combined into one single indicator through a linear 
unobserved components model. It is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. 
Finally, contrary to the other measures the data for the Vanhanen (2000) index are not 
based on expert evaluations. It consists of two variables: a competition variable, calculated 
by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party from 100, and a 
participation variable, taken as the percentage of the total population participating in 
elections. A democracy variable is then constructed as the product of the competition and 
the participation variable divided by 100. The multiplication is because Vanhanen, like 
Dahl (1971), regards both competition and participation as necessary requirements for 
democracy; adding the two variables up would have implied instead that a high score on 
one variable can compensate for a low score on the other. 
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The Dependent Variables and the Hypotheses to be Tested 
Of course, environmental commitment is a non-observable variable. I therefore use a range 
of variables, which are supposed to function as proxy variables. More specifically, these 
variables include: 
 
• The signing and ratification of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). 
• The membership in environmental intergovernmental organisations (EIOs). 
• The extent to which reporting requirements for the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) are met. 
• The percentage of a country’s land area under protection status. 
• The existence of a National Council on Sustainable Development (NCSD) in a country. 
• The availability of environmentally relevant information concerning a country. 
 
Our basic hypothesis to be tested throughout is that democratic countries are more 
environmentally committed as measured by these proxy variables than non-democratic 
countries.  
 
Multilateral environmental agreements and environmental intergovernmental 
organisations 
One revelation of environmental commitment is the signing and ratification of MEAs. Of 
the more than 180 or so existing MEAs only few are suitable for our purpose here. First, 
many of these MEAs are regional rather than global. Second, we want to look here at 
MEAs that do not have quasi-universal membership. This is because it is exactly these 
17 
MEAs where environmental commitment is needed on behalf of countries to join. MEAs 
with quasi-universal membership, on the other hand, are often agreements that can be 
joined without commitment to incurring any costly action, where costs could be either 
monetary or opportunity costs. 
Having examined a great many MEAs, I decided to pick four that fulfil these criteria: 
the Kyoto Protocol (84 signatures as of 27 November 2000; www.unfccc.org), the 
Copenhagen Amendment to the Montreal Protocol (115 ratifications as of 8 December 
2000; www.unep.org/ozone), the Rotterdam Convention (73 signatures as of 17 January 
2001; www.chem.unep.ch); and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (81 signatures as of 
22 December 2000; www.biodiv.org).8 These agreements cover four important areas of 
recent multilateral environmental concern, namely climate change, ozone layer depletion, 
trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides, and danger to biodiversity posed by 
genetically modified organisms.9 Data on the status of signature and ratification are from 
the homepages of the respective MEAs. A dummy for each MEA was created, which was 
set to 1 if a country had signed (or ratified in the case of the Montreal Amendment) the 
agreement and 0 otherwise. 
Whether a country signs a particular MEA obviously depends on a great many factors 
that might differ from MEA to MEA. In looking at the four MEAs taken together, we 
would therefore hope to get a more systematic result on what factors impact upon a 
country's willingness to sign or ratify MEAs. A further variable was therefore created as the 
sum of the dummy variables for the MEAs, so that it ranges from 0 to 4 depending on how 
many of these MEAs a country has signed/ratified, if any. 
Environmentally committed countries can also be expected to participate strongly in 
environmental intergovernmental organisations (EIOs) for the same kind of reasoning that 
leads us to expect that they are more willing to sign and ratify MEAs than non-committed 
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countries. The number of memberships in EIOs as of 1998 is taken from WEF (2001, 
annex 6), based on a codification of 100 intergovernmental organisations as 
“environmental” and data from the Yearbook of International Organisations.10 This leads 
us to our first two hypotheses to be tested: 
 
H1: Democracies are more likely to sign or ratify MEAs than non-democracies. 
H2: Democracies participate in more EIOs than non-democracies. 
 
CITES reporting requirements 
Besides the signing and ratification of MEAs a good test for the extent of environmental 
commitment is a country’s compliance with the requirements of a MEA. Those 
requirements are usually costly to comply with, hence more committed countries will be 
more willing to incur the costs. Unfortunately, quantitative compliance data for a large 
sample of countries is usually not available. However, there is one MEA for which such 
data exist, namely the percentage of reporting requirements CITES parties have met. Data 
as of 1997 are from WRI (2000, table BI.4). This leads us to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Democracies meet a higher percentage of their reporting requirements under CITES 
than non-democracies. 
 
Land area under protection status 
Land area under protection status is another variable concerned with more traditional 
nature conservation and wildlife protection. Data on the percentage of land area a country 
has put under protection according to any of the five management categories of the 
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International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as of 1997 come from WRI 
(2000, table BI.1). We postulate as our fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: Democracies put a higher percentage of their land area under protection status than 
non-democracies. 
 
Presence of a National Council on Sustainable Development 
In the wake of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, many countries started to set up a 
National Council on Sustainable Development (NCSD) (132 countries as of 9 February 
2001 had such a council; www.ecouncil.ac.cr). A dummy was created, which was set to 1 if 
a country had a NCSD, and 0 otherwise. The objective of these councils is the promotion 
and implementation of sustainable development at the national level, thus translating 
Agenda 21 into national strategies. The NCSDs can be regarded as the country level 
counterpart to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), 
which was established after the Earth Summit. In almost all countries the NCSD is set up 
and coordinated by some governmental agency. The existence of a NCSD can thus be 
interpreted as a sign for a country’s environmental commitment. This leads us to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H5: Democracies are more likely to have a National Council on Sustainable Development 
than non-democracies. 
 
Availability of environmentally relevant information 
Lack of standardized and internationally comparable environmentally relevant information 
has long since represented a problem to researchers. While very often information 
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collection is undertaken by international organisations with relatively little influence of the 
domestic country, we would nevertheless expect an environmentally committed country to 
actively seek provision of environmentally relevant information, if only for the purpose of 
its own domestic environmental policy making. This could take place either via own data 
collection or via encouraging international organisations to undertake the research 
necessary for information provision in their country. 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) has commissioned an Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI), which aggregates 67 variables. While not all variables have a 
direct link to the environment, taken together they provide a good indication of a country’s 
environmental sustainability potential. Information is not available for all the 67 variables 
for all the 122 countries covered (data taken from WEF, 2001, annex 6). We would expect 
that in the case of an environmentally committed country information on fewer variables 
are missing and therefore postulate our sixth hypothesis: 
 
H6: Democracies have more variables available in the set of ESI variables than non-
democracies. 
 
Appendix 2 provides a Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent variables (in case of 
MEAs only the summary variable is included). The correlation coefficients are all positive 
as expected, which is important since after all they are all supposed to proxy the same 
underlying non-observable phenomenon environmental commitment. At the same time, the 
correlations are nowhere near 100%. Anything else would suggest redundancy among the 
proxy variables. 
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The Independent Variables 
Turning to the independent variables, as concerns the democracy variables, I have grouped 
countries together and used discrete dummy variables rather than a continuous variable 
throughout. Use of dummy variables allows for easier interpretation and understanding of 
the statistical results. One disadvantage of dummy variable use is a loss of variation in the 
explanatory variables, which usually brings with it greater standard errors in the estimation 
results. Another problem is the somewhat arbitrary fixation of the dummy variable 
boundaries. For the purpose of sensitivity analysis all regressions have therefore been run 
with democracy entered as a continuous variable and with changes in the boundaries of the 
dummy variables within a reasonable range (results not reported). For practically all 
regressions reported further below, entering democracy as a continuous variable has 
confirmed their results with higher statistical significance. Furthermore, results were 
largely unaffected by modest changes in the boundaries for the dummy variables. 
As concerns the Freedom House variables, both their political rights and their civil 
liberty index runs on a 1 to 7 scale. I have added up the two to create a continuous variable 
on a 2 to 14 scale. For the dummy variables, I have followed Freedom House in classifying 
countries into three groups in accordance with their classification of countries as not free, 
partly free and free. In general, countries are considered not free if their added score is 
between 11 and 14, as partly free if the score is between 6 and 11, and as free if the score is 
between 2 and 6. As can be seen, there is some ambiguity if countries have a score of either 
6 or 11 and Freedom House uses additional information not included in the score in order 
to group countries then. I therefore created a dummy variable FREE-low, which was set to 
1 if the country was classified by Freedom House as not free, and 0 otherwise, a dummy 
FREE-mid, which was set to 1 if the country was classified as partly free, and 0 otherwise 
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as well as FREE-high, which was set equal to 1 if the country was considered free, and 0 
otherwise. Data come from Freedom House (2000). 
As concerns the Polity data, the original data set provides two indices on a 0 to 10 
scale, one for the extent of a country’s democratic and the other for its autocratic 
characteristics. I followed Hauge & Ellingsen (1998) in putting countries into three groups. 
A dummy variable POLIT-low was created, which was set to 1 if the subtraction of the 
autocracy score from the democracy score in 1998 led to a result between –10 and –6, and 
0 otherwise. Similarly, a POLIT-mid dummy was set to 1 if this result was between –5 and 
5, and 0 otherwise and a POLIT-high dummy, set to 1 if the result was above 5, and 0 
otherwise. Data are from Gurr & Jaggers (2000). 
The governance indicator developed by World Bank staff is standardized to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of about one, with a minimum of about -1.8 and a 
maximum of about 1.7. I have constructed a dummy variable GOV-low, which was set to 1 
if this indicator was below -.8, and 0 otherwise; a GOV-mid dummy, which was set to 1 if 
the indicator was between -.8 than 0, and 0 otherwise; and a GOV-high dummy, which was 
set to 1 if the indicator was above 0, and 0 otherwise.11 Data come from Kaufmann, Kraay 
& Zoido-Lobatón (1999a, b). 
Following Vanhanen (2000: 257), I have constructed a VAN-autoc dummy variable, 
which is set to 1 if the competition variable is below 30, the participation value below 10 
or the democracy variable below 5, and 0 otherwise. A VAN-demo dummy variable is set 
to 1 if VAN-autoc is equal to 0 and vice versa. The reader should note that the relevant 
dummy categories exhaust the full array of countries in order to facilitate reference to any 
one group of countries, but that for all estimations one of the dummy categories was left 
out, of course, to avoid the so-called dummy variable trap. 
23 
Besides democracy (our hypothesis to be tested), which other factors would one 
theoretically expect to impact upon the environmental commitment of a country? First, per 
capita income should have a positive impact upon environmental commitment. In 
economic terms this would mean that environmental commitment is a luxury good with an 
income elasticity greater than one.12 This need not imply that poor countries care less about 
the environment per se. Rather, because of their poverty they might prioritize issues other 
than the environment. Income per capita is measured as gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) in US$ in 1998, taken from UNDP (2000).13 
Second, big and “important” countries should be more environmentally committed 
than small and “unimportant” ones. As a proxy for this variable one could either take a 
country’s total income or population since, all other things equal, both the economic and 
the population size of a country should be positively correlated with “importance”. Since 
per capita income is already included and controlled for, I decided to use population size as 
a proxy.14 More important countries might show signs of stronger environmental 
commitment not necessarily due to stronger environmental concern per se. Rather, we 
hypothesize here that these countries will find it in their interest to demonstrate 
environmental commitment, particularly with respect to certain proxy variables for 
commitment, in order to demonstrate their importance in world politics, of which the 
environment represents one part. In other words, important countries want to be seen as 
good citizens and leaders in world environmental affairs.15 Data on the size of a country’s 
population and its population density (population divided by land area in square 
kilometres) in 1998, which is additionally used in one estimation, stem from World Bank 
(2000). Appendix 3 provides summary descriptive statistics for all independent and 
dependent variables, apart from the binary dummy variables for the individual MEAs and 
the existence of a NCSD. 
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Statistical Issues 
Before results are presented, a short discussion of potential statistical problems seems 
warranted. Because of the huge variation in GDP per capita and in population size among 
countries, which could potentially lead to heteroscedasticity, the two variables entered the 
regressions as their natural logs. Cook-Weisberg tests sometimes still found evidence for 
heteroscedasticity, however. For that reason all regressions were run with 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Two of the dependent variables, namely “% of CITES reporting requirements met” and 
“% of land area under protection” might cause problems in OLS estimation. While none of 
them is censored, the fact that the dependent variable is equal to 0 (as well as 100 in case of 
CITES) for a few countries might nevertheless bias OLS estimates. Tobit estimation, a 
maximum likelihood technique suitable for dealing with limited dependent variables, was 
therefore run as well for these two variables. As the results were very similar, only the OLS 
estimates are shown below.16 
Developed countries tend to be environmentally committed in the sense that they 
generally fare well on our proxy indicators. Since, according to the definition used in this 
article, all developed countries are democracies this represents a potential problem. If we 
find that democracy is a significant explanatory variable for environmental commitment, 
then this result might be triggered in part by the presence of developed countries in the 
sample. In spite of controlling already for income per capita, which is highly correlated 
with a country being developed or not, I have therefore run most regressions twice: once 
for the full sample and once for a subset excluding developed countries. Doing so also 
allows one to examine whether multicollinearity between income and the democracy 
variables poses a serious problem. Table I shows the correlation between lnGDP, the 
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income variable, and the four variables of democracy both for the full and for the restricted 
sample.17 As can be seen, the correlation coefficients are much lower for the restricted 
sample. 
 
< Insert Table I here > 
 
Because of the presumed sign of the democracy variables, in principle one-tailed 
significance tests could have been reported. Instead, I decided to report two-tailed tests, but 
to take a rather high threshold of 10% as an indication of statistical significance. All OLS 
regressions were run with a constant included, even though its coefficient is not reported 
below. N, the number of observations, varies across the various regressions. For the same 
dependent variable, N varies due to variances in the availability of the democracy 
measures. For different dependent variables, N varies due to variances in the availability of 
the dependent variable. 
 
 
Results 
Multilateral environmental agreements and environmental intergovernmental 
organisations 
Table II reports the results of probit estimates for each of the four MEAs.18 The reported 
coefficients are already changes in the probability at the mean of a variable, not the 
untransformed probit coefficients. For our dummy variables the coefficient gives the 
probability for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. Only the results for the 
Freedom House democracy variable are shown. Results for the other three democracy 
variables can be found in appendix 4. 
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< Insert Table II here > 
 
As concerns the Kyoto Protocol, all coefficients have the expected sign and all 
democracy coefficients are statistically significant. To understand the correct interpretation 
of the coefficients of the democracy variables, refer to the estimate for the full sample case. 
The estimate for these two dummy variables means that after controlling for differences in 
per capita income and a country’s population size, FREE-low countries are 42% less likely 
to have signed the Kyoto Protocol than FREE-high countries. Similarly, FREE-mid 
countries are 35% less likely to have signed.19 
As concerns the Biosafety Protocol, all coefficients have the expected sign. The FREE-
mid dummy is statistically insignificant in the restricted sample on its own, but gains 
significance in combination with the FREE-low dummy. With respect to the Rotterdam 
Convention, while the democracy coefficients have the expected signs they are statistically 
insignificant throughout both on their own and combined. No results for the restricted 
sample are shown as in these cases a Wald test failed to reject the hypothesis that the 
explanatory variables taken together have no explanatory power for the POLIT and GOV 
variables and only marginal power for the FREE variables. As concerns the Copenhagen 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, all coefficients have the expected signs. The FREE-
mid variable is insignificant in the restricted sample on its own, but gains combined 
significance with the FREE-low dummy. 
Table III provides an ordered probit estimate for the sum of MEAs variable. Ordered 
probit is suitable for ordinally ordered data. While a country with a score of 4 cannot be 
said to exhibit double the environmental commitment as a country scoring 2, it can be said 
to exhibit a higher commitment. In other words the sum of MEAs can be interpreted as an 
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ordinal variable, where 4 can be interpreted as excellent, 3 as good, 2 as satisfactory, 1 as 
poor and 0 as very poor commitment. For reasons of space availability, only the results for 
the restricted sample are shown here.20 All coefficients have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant on their own, apart from the POLIT-mid variable, which gains 
significance only in combination. The coefficients from ordered probit estimates have no 
direct meaning. Together with information on the so-called cut points (not reported), they 
can be used to compute predicted probabilities, however. Such probabilities are shown for 
illustrative purposes for the FREE dummy variables only. While, for example, FREE-low 
countries have a predicted probability of 14% of having signed three MEAs (a sign for 
good commitment), the respective probability for FREE-high countries is much higher at 
34%. 
 
<Insert Table III here> 
 
Turning to the number of environmental intergovernmental organisations a country 
participates in, Table IV presents OLS estimate results. All coefficients have the expected 
sign apart from the POLIT-mid variables, which are statistically insignificant, however. 
The GOV-mid dummy is statistically insignificant in the restricted sample, but gains 
significance in combination. The VAN-autoc variables are insignificant in both samples, if 
only marginally so. A correct interpretation of the coefficients with reference to the full 
sample is that FREE-low countries on average participate in 3.38 and FREE-mid countries 
in 3.07 EIOs less than FREE-high countries. Interpretation of the other coefficients 
reported in Table IV is analogous. 
 
<Insert Table IV here> 
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CITES reporting requirements 
OLS estimate results for the percentage of CITES reporting requirements met as the 
dependent variable can be found in Table V. All coefficients have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant, apart from FREE-mid and POLIT-mid, which are not 
significant on their own, but in their combination with FREE-low and POLIT-low. The 
correct interpretation of the coefficients of the democracy variables is illustrated again with 
respect to the estimate for the FREE variables in the full sample case. FREE-low countries 
have on average an estimated 23 percentage points and FREE-mid countries an estimated 9 
percentage points lower reporting rate than FREE-high countries. 
 
<Insert Table V here> 
 
Land area under protection status 
OLS estimate results for the percentage of land area under protection status as the 
dependent variable can be found in Table VI. For this regression only, a country’s 
population density was added as an explanatory variable. The expectation is that a country 
with a lower population density can afford to put a higher percentage of its territory under 
protection status than a country with a high population density. The income variable is 
sometimes and the population variable is throughout statistically insignificant. The 
democracy and the population density variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant throughout. Referring to the FREE variables in the full sample case, 
FREE-low countries have on average an estimated 5.87 and FREE-mid countries an 
estimated 5.96 percentage points of their total land area less under protection status in 
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comparison to FREE-high countries. Interpretation for the other reported results in this 
table is analogous. 
 
<Insert Table VI here> 
 
Existence of a National Council on Sustainable Development (NCSD) 
Table VII provides probit estimation results for the existence of a NCSD. All coefficients 
have the expected sign. All democracy coefficients are statistically significant, apart from 
FREE-mid and POLIT-mid, which only gain combined significance with the FREE-low 
and POLIT-low dummies. Referring to the full sample case, FREE-low countries are 
estimated to have a 30% lower likelihood for the existence of a NCSD than FREE-high 
countries. Interpretation for the other democracy variables is analogous. 
 
<Insert Table VII here> 
 
Availability of environmentally relevant information 
Lastly, OLS estimate results for the number of ESI variables available as the dependent 
variable can be found in Table VIII. All coefficients have the expected sign and are highly 
statistically significant, which leads to high R2 values throughout. Referring to the FREE 
variables in the full sample case, FREE-low countries have on average an estimated 4.1 
ESI variables and FREE-mid countries an estimated 2.5 ESI variables less available than 
FREE-high countries. Interpretation for the other reported results in this table is analogous. 
 
< Insert Table VIII here > 
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Discussion and Concluding Observations 
Taken together, the results reported in the last section provide strong evidence in favour of 
our hypothesis that democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment 
than non-democracies. This result appears to be relatively robust with respect to our 
different measures of environmental commitment. For the great majority of these proxies 
of environmental commitment the democracy variables not only have the expected sign, 
but are also statistically significant. It is also quite robust with respect to our different 
measures of democracy. No single measure of democracy provides systematically different 
estimates in terms of sign of coefficients and their statistical significance from the other 
three.21 Equally satisfying is that the coefficients and their significance remain roughly the 
same whether developed countries are included in the full sample or excluded in the 
restricted sample. In other words, the results are not simply triggered by the presence of 
developed democratic countries. 
Almost throughout we observe that the coefficients for the FREE-low, POLIT-low and 
GOV-low countries indicate less environmental commitment at stronger statistical 
significance than the coefficients for the FREE-mid, POLIT-mid and GOV-mid countries. 
In other words, clearly undemocratic countries exhibit even less environmental 
commitment than countries in the middle group and we can be more certain that their 
commitment differs significantly from clear democracies than we can be for the group in 
between. This was to be expected of course. 
In conclusion, this study provides a positive message: Democracies clearly show 
stronger environmental commitment than non-democracies. All other things equal, 
therefore, a more democratic world will also be a world with stronger environmental 
commitment. This need not translate into better environmental outcomes, however, at least 
31 
not immediately. Theory predicts a stronger link of democracy with environmental 
commitment than with outcomes. Gleditsch & Sverdrup (1995: 8) suspect this much when 
they write that ‘the crucial point is that regardless of what harm democracies may do to the 
environment, they are more likely to make corrective action’. As democracy spreads 
around the world, so will environmental commitment. More environmental commitment 
will help preventing environmental scarcities from leading to extreme outcomes like 
violent conflict. There is thus another avenue through which democracy can foster peace. 
Interestingly, it is really democracy or political freedom that matters. Pre-testing 
rejected economic freedom as a relevant variable. Just because a country limits its 
interference in the economic system and allows its people to engage freely in doing 
business, does not render it environmentally committed. But allowing its people to receive 
independent information, to voice and organise their concerns and to dis-elect policy 
makers for failure to address citizens’ preferences leads to enhanced environmental 
commitment. 
This is not to say that democracies do not suffer from deficiencies and even failures 
with respect to environmental commitment. For example, future generations are affected by 
environmental degradation, but cannot express their preferences in the political market 
place of the present. Environmental degradation cuts across national boundaries, which is 
likely to lead to excessive global environmental pollution in the absence of a central 
political authority (world government). Environmental degradation also cuts across 
administrative boundaries within nation-states, which renders policies successfully 
addressing these problems more difficult (Doeleman 1997). But the point is that non-
democracies equally suffer from these deficiencies, if not more. While democracy is less 
than perfect, there is no better alternative. 
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Of course, democracy is not a static concept and it evolves over time. Some argue that 
the modern Western model of representative democracy with infrequent elections, 
substantial influence of lobby groups benefiting from environmental degradation, little 
mobilisation of the people and limited participation outside well defined and narrow 
boundaries is ill equipped to deal with long-term environmental problems and therefore 
needs to be transformed into a more “deliberative” or “associative” democracy (Lafferty & 
Meadowcroft, 1996; Doeleman, 1997). Addressing these issues is beyond the limits of this 
article, however, and is left to future research. Suffice it to say here that, again, while 
representative democracy might not be perfect, it is surely better than any non-democratic 
alternative. 
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Appendix 1. Pearson correlation matrix for democracy variables (full sample) 
 
 
FREE POLIT GOV VAN 
FREE 1.00    
POLIT .92 1.00   
GOV .94 .83 1.00  
VAN .81 .77 .81 1.00 
 
FREE: Freedom House variable. POLIT: Polity variable. GOV: Governance variable. 
VAN: Vanhanen variable. 
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Appendix 2. Pearson correlation matrix for dependent variables (full sample) 
 
 
Sum of 
MEAs 
Number of 
EIOs 
% of CITES 
reporting 
requirements 
% of land 
area under 
protection 
Existence 
of NCSD 
ESI 
variables 
available 
Sum of MEAs 
 
 
1.00      
Number of EIOs 
 
 
.49 1.00     
% of CITES repor-
ting requirements 
 
.25 .43 1.00    
% of land area 
under protection 
 
.23 .19 .32 1.00   
Existence of NCSD 
 
 
.50 .27 .40 .29 1.00  
ESI variables 
available 
 
.54 .64 .51 .17 .30 1.00 
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Appendix 3. Summary descriptive statistics for variables 
 
Dependent variables N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Sum of MEAs 205 1.76 1.37 0 4 
Number of EIOs 121 13.64 6.67 2 35 
% of CITES requirements met 121 69.61 30.51 0 100 
% land area under protection 154 7.43 7.67 0 42.6 
Number of ESI variables available 122 54.48 5.03 47 65 
      
Independent variables      
FREE 187 7.09 3.97 2 14 
if FREE-low=1 48 12.42 1.23 11 14 
if FREE-mid=1 55 8.23 1.45 6 11 
if FREE-high=1 84 3.31 1.15 2 6 
POLIT 159 2.78 6.77 -10 10 
if POLIT-low=1 32 -7.47 1.32 -10 -6 
if POLIT-mid=1 46 -.48 2.87 -5 5 
if POLIT-high=1 81 8.68 1.34 6 10 
GOV 171 0 .96 -1.79 1.69 
if GOV-low=1 40 -1.24 .29 -1.79 -.854 
if GOV-mid=1 53 -.39 .25 -.778 0 
if GOV-high=1 78 .89 .52 .013 1.69 
VAN 183 15.74 12.69 0 43.54 
if VAN-autoc=1 60 1.96 2.85 0 11.73 
if VAN-demo=1 123 22.46 9.88 5.85 43.54 
lnGDP 175 8.33 1.10 6.13 10.42 
lnPOP 205 15.13 2.26 9.83 20.94 
POPdens 183 113.33 153.73 2 965 
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Appendix 4. Probit estimates for MEA variables (POLIT/GOV/VAN dummies) 
 
 Kyoto Protocol Biosafety Protocol Rotterdam Convention Copenhagen Amendment 
 Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Full sample Restricted sample 
 dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| 
POLIT-low -.34 .004 -.29 .009 -.43 .000 -.41 .000 -.08 .431 -.33 .003 -.31 .007 
POLIT-mid -.21 .006 -.18 .080 -.25 .018 -.24 .025 -.12 .101 -.19 .079 -.17 .122 
lnGDP .20 .000 .15 .003 -.01 .767 -.05 .303 .10 .019 .20 .000 .19 .000 
lnPOP .06 .064 .04 .200 .07 .021 .09 .005 .08 .000 .05 .017 .05 .037 
 Combined POLIT 
P-value <.0058 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2303 
N=153 
Combined POLIT 
P-value <.0157 
P>chi2=.0005 
Pseudo R2=.1278 
N=130 
Combined POLIT 
P-value <.0003 
P>chi2=.0001 
Pseudo R2= 1188 
N=153 
Combined POLIT 
P-value <.0009 
P>chi2=.0002 
Pseudo R2=.1298 
N=130 
Combined POLIT 
P-value <.7323 
P>chi2=.0041 
Pseudo R2=.0757 
N=153 
Combined POLIT 
P-value <.2457 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2296 
N=153 
Combined POLIT 
P-value <.3410 
P>chi2=0002 
Pseudo R2=.1397 
N=130 
 Kyoto Protocol Biosafety Protocol Rotterdam Convention Copenhagen Amendment 
 Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Full sample Restricted sample 
 dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| 
GOV-low -.28 .025 -.23 .042 -.37 .001 -.37 .002 -.10 .372 -.35 .004 -.33 .007 
GOV-mid -.31 .003 -.26 .011 -.20 .046 -.19 .070 -.14 .168 -.15 .161 -.13 .245 
lnGDP .19 .000 .15 .002 -.01 .778 -.05 .291 .09 .028 .19 .000 .18 .000 
lnPOP .07 .017 .05 .081 .10 .000 .12 .000 .08 002 .07 .020 .07 .035 
 Combined GOV 
P-value <.0051 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2224 
N=164 
Combined GOV 
P-value <.0197 
P>chi2=.0003 
Pseudo R2=.1230 
N=141 
Combined GOV 
P-value <.0045 
P>chi2=.0006 
Pseudo R2=.1131 
N=164 
Combined GOV 
P-value <.0058 
P>chi2=.0004 
Pseudo R2=.1273 
N=141 
Combined GOV 
P-value <.3540 
P>chi2=.0009 
Pseudo R2=.0880 
N=164 
Combined GOV 
P-value <.0126 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2275 
N=164 
Combined GOV 
P-value <.0236 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1445 
N=141 
 Kyoto Protocol Biosafety Protocol Rotterdam Convention Copenhagen Amendment 
 Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Full sample Restricted sample 
 dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| 
VAN-autoc -.30 .001 -.27 .002 -.36 .000 -.35 .000 -.07 .453 -.25 .006 -.24 .008 
lnGDP .20 .000 .15 .001 -.00 .971 -.04 .370 .11 .004 .21 .000 .19 .000 
lnPOP .04 .048 .03 .220 .07 .001 .08 .001 .97 .000 .05 .024 .05 .051 
 P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2038 
N=175 
P>chi2=.0001 
Pseudo R2=.1190 
N=152 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1166 
N=175 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1200 
N=152 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.0946 
N=175 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2171 
N=175 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1394 
N=152 
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Table I. Pearson correlation matrix for income with democracy variables – full versus 
restricted sample 
 
 
lnGDP 
(full sample) 
lnGDP 
(restricted sample) 
FREE .54 .30 
POLIT .40 .18 
GOV .66 .42 
VAN .61 .40 
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Table II. Probit estimates for MEA variables (FREE dummies) 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Kyoto Protocol 
Dependent Variable: 
Biosafety Protocol 
Dependent Variable: 
Rotterdam Convention 
Dependent Variable: 
Copenhagen Amendment 
 Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Full sample Restricted sample 
 dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| 
FREE-low -.42 .000 -.37 .000 -.31 .002 -.29 .005 -.08 .431 -.33 .003 -.31 .007 
FREE-mid -.36 .001 -.31 .002 -.19 .081 -.16 .131 -.12 .101 -.19 .079 -.17 .122 
lnGDP .16 .000 .13 .004 -.00 .990 -.03 .543 .10 .019 .20 .000 .19 .000 
lnPOP .05 .026 .04 .107 .07 .001 .08 .002 .08 .000 .05 .017 .05 .037 
 Combined FREE 
P-value <.0000 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2403 
N=175 
Combined FREE 
P-value <.0003 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1507 
N=152 
Combined FREE 
P-value <.0115 
P>chi2=.0015 
Pseudo R2=.0862 
N=175 
Combined FREE 
P-value <.0239 
P>chi2=.0050 
Pseudo R2=.0807 
N=152 
Combined FREE 
P-value <.5075 
P>chi2=.0002 
Pseudo R2=.0979 
N=175 
Combined FREE 
P-value <.0082 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2231 
N=175 
Combined FREE 
P-value <.0185 
P>chi2=.0001 
Pseudo R2=.1427 
N=152 
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Table III. Ordered probit estimates for sum of MEAs variable 
 
Dependent Variable: Sum of MEAs 
Restricted  sample 
 Coeff. P>|z|   Coeff. P>|z| 
FREE-low -1.00 .000  POLIT-low -.81 .002 
FREE-mid -.72 .005  POLIT-mid -.31 .161 
lnGDP .30 .001  lnGDP .37 .000 
lnPOP .20 .001  lnPOP .17 .019 
Combined FREE P-value <.0001 
P>chi2=.0000  Pseudo R2=.0865  N=152 
Combined POLIT P-value <.0048 
P>chi2=.0000  Pseudo R2=.0760  N=130 
       
GOV-low -.72 .002     
GOV-mid -.49 .034  VAN-autoc -.80 .000 
lnGDP .21 .002  lnGDP .33 .001 
lnPOP .19 .001  lnPOP .18 .001 
Combined GOV P-value <.0056 
P>chi2=.0001  Pseudo R2=.0765  N=141 
 
P>chi2=.0000  Pseudo R2=.0855  N=152 
       
 FREE-low countries FREE-mid countries FREE-high countries 
# of MEAs Pred. P. St. Dev Pred. P. St. Dev. Pred. P. St. Dev. 
0 .30 .14 .23 .13 .05 .06 
1 .29 .03 .27 ..06 .12 .09 
2 .23 .06 .25 .04 .21 .08 
3 .14 .08 .19 .10 .33 .07 
4 .03 .03 .05 .06 .28 .19 
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Table IV. OLS estimates for EIO variable 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of EIOs a country participates in 
 Full sample Restricted sample 
 Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
FREE-low -3.38 .011 -1.92 .085 
FREE-mid -3.07 .000 -1.56 .021 
lnGDP 2.70 .000 .88 .012 
lnPOP 2.16 .000 1.82 .000 
 Combined FREE P-value <.0005 
P>F=.0000  R2=.5397  N=121 
Combined FREE P-value <.0320 
P>F=.0000  R2=3831  N=100 
  
POLIT-low -3.35 .018 -2.11 .070 
POLIT-mid .39 .701 1.19 .165 
lnGDP 3.36 .000 1.24 .001 
lnPOP 2.08 .000 1.74 .000 
 Combined POLIT  P-value <.0390 
P>F=.0000  R2=.5302  N=121 
Combined POLIT P-value <.0431 
P>F=.0000  R2=.4120  N=100 
  
GOV-low -3.61 .004 -2.38 .029 
GOV-mid -1.85 .040 -.49 .526 
lnGDP 2.92 .000 .97 .000 
lnPOP 2.21 .000 1.84 .000 
 Combined GOV  P-value <.0087 
P>F=.0000  R2=.5282  N=121 
Combined GOV P-value <.0903 
P>F=.0000  R2=.3851  N=100 
  
VAN-autoc -1.75 .108 -1.46 .121 
lnGDP 3.20 .000 .95 .000 
lnPOP 2.10 .000 1.78 .000 
 P>F=.0000  R2=.5100  N=121 P>F=.0000  R2=.3732  N=100 
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Table V. OLS estimates for CITES reporting requirements variable 
 
Dependent Variable: 
% of CITES reporting requirements met 
 Full sample Restricted sample 
 Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
FREE-low -22.87 .006 -22.31 .007 
FREE-mid -9.14 .175 -8.50 .218 
lnGDP 7.66 .003 6.64 .040 
lnPOP 3.87 .013 4.06 .022 
 Combined FREE P-value <.0231 
P>F=.0000  R2=.3091  N=118 
Combined FREE P-value <.0257 
P>F=.0001  R2=.1983  N=98 
  
POLIT-low -25.00 .013 -24.52 .016 
POLIT-mid -8.13 .189 -7.82 .213 
lnGDP 8.91 .000 7.62 .014 
lnPOP 4.46 .010 4.83 .013 
 Combined POLIT P-value <.0356 
P>F=.0000  R2=.3211  N=115 
Combined POLIT P-value <.0448 
P>F=.0004  R2=.2104  N=95 
  
GOV-low -27.27 .002 -27.17 .002 
GOV-mid -11.76 .050 -11.28 .067 
lnGDP 6.90 .004 5.65 .067 
lnPOP 4.46 .003 4.72 .005 
 Combined GOV P-value <.0077 
P>F=.0000  R2=.3205  N=118 
Combined GOV P-value <.0073 
P>F=.0000  R2=.2145  N=98 
  
VAN-autoc -17.64 .013 -17.71 .013 
lnGDP 8.44 .000 6.63 .032 
lnPOP 3.92 .011 4.08 .020 
 P>F=.0000  R2=.2979  N=118 P>F=.0001  R2=.1901  N=98 
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Table VI. OLS estimates for land area under protection status variable 
 
Dependent Variable: 
% of land area under protection 
 Full sample Restricted sample 
 Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
FREE-low -5.87 .001 -5.67 .004 
FREE-mid -5.96 .000 -5.69 .001 
lnGDP .34 .586 -.08 .882 
lnPOP .25 .720 .14 .708 
POPdens -.01 .029 -.01 .041 
 Combined FREE P-value <.0009 
P>F=.0003  R2=.1761  N=145 
Combined FREE P-value <.0055 
P>F=.0202  R2=.1509  N=123 
  
POLIT-low -3.51 .040 -3.16 .073 
POLIT-mid -3.67 .007 -3.55 .011 
lnGDP 1.02 .085 .26 .643 
lnPOP .13 .731 -.02 .949 
POPdens -.01 .025 -.01 .033 
 Combined POLIT P-value <.0203 
P>F=.0041  R2=.1162  N=141 
Combined POLIT P-value <.0376 
P>F=.0963  R2=.0778  N=119 
  
GOV-low -4.10 .022 -3.92 .033 
GOV-mid -3.61 .024 -3.23 .055 
lnGDP .87 .175 .23 .810 
lnPOP .23 .537 .10 .810 
POPdens -.01 .050 -.01 .064 
 Combined GOV P-value <.0459 
P>F=.0049  R2=.1192  N=145 
Combined GOV P-value <.0879 
P>F=.1176  R2=.0790  N=123 
  
VAN-autoc -2.39 .056 -2.31 .065 
lnGDP 1.40 .016 .56 .327 
lnPOP .12 .754 -.04 .922 
POPdens -.01 .049 -.01 .060 
 P>F=.0035  R2=.0940  N=145 P>F=.0794  R2=.0523  N=123 
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Table VII. Probit estimates for existence of National Council on Sustainable Development 
variable 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Existence of NCSD 
 Full sample Restricted sample 
 dF/dx P>|z| dF/dx P>|z| 
FREE-low -.30 .002 -.31 .004 
FREE-mid -.09 .301 -.10 .343 
lnGDP .08 .012 .10 .021 
lnPOP .09 .000 .10 .000 
 Combined FREE 
P-value <.0049 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2105 
N=175 
Combined FREE 
P-value <.0077 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1678 
N=152 
     
POLIT-low -.29 .004 -.31 .005 
POLIT-mid -.09 .327 -.10 .337 
lnGDP .09 .012 .10 .024 
lnPOP .08 .001 .08 .003 
 Combined POLIT 
P-value <.0117 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1964 
N=153 
Combined POLIT 
P-value <.0148 
P>chi2=.0005 
Pseudo R2=.1537 
N=130 
     
GOV-low -.31 .007 -.32 .010 
GOV-mid -.20 .029 -.21 .042 
lnGDP .07 .045 .08 .073 
lnPOP .09 .000 .10 .000 
 Combined GOV 
P-value <.0065 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.2020 
N=164 
Combined GOV 
P-value <.0112 
P>chi2=.0002 
Pseudo R2=.1572 
N=141 
     
VAN-autoc -.19 .012 -.20 .016 
lnGDP .09 .004 .10 .020 
lnPOP .09 .000 .10 .000 
 P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1914 
N=175 
P>chi2=.0000 
Pseudo R2=.1485 
N=152 
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Table VIII. OLS estimates for environmental information availability variable 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of ESI variables available 
 Full sample Restricted sample 
 Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
FREE-low -4.09 .000 -4.22 .000 
FREE-mid -2.46 .000 -2.57 .000 
lnGDP 2.33 .000 2.38 .000 
lnPOP 1.69 .000 1.95 .000 
 Combined FREE P-value <.0000 
P>F=.0000  R2=.6936  N=122 
Combined FREE P-value <.0000 
P>F=.0000  R2=.6654  N=100 
  
POLIT-low -3.76 .000 -3.79 .000 
POLIT-mid -1.78 .006 -1.80 .006 
lnGDP 2.65 .000 2.65 .000 
lnPOP 1.62 .000 1.85 .000 
 Combined POLIT P-value <.0002 
P>F=.0000  R2=.6798  N=122 
Combined POLIT P-value <.0002 
P>F=.0000  R2=.6419  N=100 
  
GOV-low -3.91 .000 -4.15 .000 
GOV-mid -2.81 .000 -2.94 .000 
lnGDP 2.35 .000 2.38 .000 
lnPOP 1.76 .000 2.04 .000 
 Combined GOV P-value <.0000 
P>F=.0000  R2=.6920  N=122 
Combined GOV P-value <.0000 
P>F=.0000  R2=.6674  N=100 
  
VAN-autoc -2.35 .002 -2.41 .001 
lnGDP 2.70 .000 2.57 .000 
lnPOP 1.64 .000 1.85 .000 
 P>F=.0000  R2=.6526  N=122 P>F=.0000  R2=.6048  N=100 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 Namely percentage of land area under protection status and availability of environmentally relevant 
information. 
2
 Similar results for NOx and SO2 emission reductions are reported in Murdoch, Sandler and Sargent (1997). 
3
 For a good overview of this literature, see Panayotou (2000). 
4
 In many cases greater than 1000. 
5
 The results are available from this author upon request. 
6
 The rather ambiguous evidence with respect to the impact of democracy and democratisation on environmental 
outcomes is not confined to quantitative studies, but can also be found in case studies. See, for example, Potter 
(1996), Earnhart (1997), Tang and Tang (1999), Walker (1999). 
7
 The signs of the correlation coefficients with the freedom variable have been reversed since higher scores in the 
Freedom House data mean lower freedom. 
8
 Some of these agreements have been concluded so recently that either no ratifications exist yet or are so few 
that we needed to look at signatures instead of ratifications. This is somewhat unfortunate as a country is only 
bound to an agreement and therefore formally committed once it has ratified the agreement, but it cannot be 
mended. Experience shows, however, that often countries feel bound by their signature, even if they have never 
ratified the agreement for whatever reason. The prime example for this type of behaviour is the United States. 
Ratification encompasses as well accession, acceptance or approval of an agreement. 
9
 Somewhat unfortunate is a lack of an agreement more directly addressing nature and wildlife conservation. The 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, which would otherwise be a good 
candidate, has quasi-universal membership (152 parties as of 22 March 2000). Fortunately, however, two of our 
other proxy variables for environmental commitment are connected to nature conservation and wildlife 
protection. 
10
 The list of organisations coded as environmental is available from the author on request. 
11
 The cut-off points were chosen with a view to allocate about the same number of countries into the three 
different groups as is the case for the FREE and POLIT dummy variables. 
12
 One might wonder whether income squared should be included as an independent variable as well to allow for 
a non-linear effect of income on environmental commitment. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature 
often includes such a term finding that environmental outcomes first worsen with rising income until a threshold 
is reached after which they improve with rising incomes. However, this non-linearity is mainly due to changes in 
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the sectoral composition of an economy during the process of industrialisation and there is no reason to presume 
that similar non-linearity exists with respect to environmental commitment. Nevertheless, in non-reported 
sensitivity analysis I tried inclusion of squared income. As expected, in almost all cases it tested insignificant. 
13
 For a few countries, the income data stem from years earlier than 1998. The bias is likely to be very small and 
would not have justified taking these countries out of the sample. 
14
 Total income and population cannot be used simultaneously as this would lead to perfect multicollinearity 
given that per capita income is another explanatory variable. 
15
 An anonymous referee raised the question how the United States, which regularly fails to sign or ratify 
multilateral environmental agreements, fits into this proposition. In my view, the US represents a very special 
case. It is without doubt the foremost power in world politics and in some sense the only world power. It does not 
need to demonstrate its importance and therefore can easily get away with failing to demonstrate international 
environmental commitment. On the other hand, lesser countries with an ambition to demonstrate their importance 
(for example, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Russia) often find themselves compelled to show 
commitment whether they are convinced of the environmental cause or not. 
16
 For the variable “% of land area under protection” an upper limit was set equal to 25. This is because higher 
reported percentages seemed somewhat implausible. Again, the estimated results were very similar. 
17
 The signs of the correlation coefficients with the freedom variable have been reversed since higher scores in 
the Freedom House data mean lower freedom. 
18
 Alternatively, logit estimates could have been undertaken. The two techniques provide very similar results 
(Verbeek, 2000). 
19
 An anonymous referee suggests that the decision to sign the Kyoto Protocol might be mainly determined by 
whether a country is a net exporter or importer of fossil fuels. In sensitivity analysis the net fossil fuel import 
position as a percentage of commercial energy use was entered as a further control variable (data taken from 
World Bank, 2000). While the coefficient of this variable is positive as expected and statistically significant 
throughout, income, democracy and population size remain statistically significant determinants for the Kyoto 
Protocol (detailed results not reported). 
20
 Results for the full sample convey the same message with higher statistical significance. 
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21
 One might think that the VAN dummy fares best throughout in terms of significance. However, this dummy 
cannot be directly compared to the other variables of democracy, as the former is a dichotomous variable, 
whereas the latter are trichotomous. 
